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CONCEPTIONS OF SPEECH ACTS IN THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION:
A CASE STUDY OF A DEBATE ABOUT ADVOCATING
Abstract. Far from being of interest only to argumentation theorists, concep-
tions of speech acts play an important role in practitioners’ self-reflection on
their own activities. After a brief review of work by Houtlosser, Jackson and
Kauffeld on the ways that speech acts provide normative frameworks for argu-
mentative interactions, this essay examines an ongoing debate among scientists
in natural resource fields as to the appropriateness of the speech act of advocat-
ing in policy settings. Scientists’ reflections on advocacy align well with current
scholarship, and the scholarship in turn can provide a deeper understanding of
how to manage the communication challenges scientists face.
Keywords: argumentation; metadiscourse; speech acts; science-policy interface;
advocacy; advice
Speech act theory may appear to be one of the most abstruse approaches
to conceptualizing argumentative activities. The theory has a deep base in
the philosophies of J.L. Austin (1962), Paul Grice (1957) and John Searle
(Searle, 1969)—a literature characterized by dense lists of recursive inten-
tions and felicity conditions. In this paper, I hope to show that far from
being an esoteric domain accessible only to argumentation theorists, con-
ceptions of speech acts are conspicuous in ordinary argumentative practice.
Arguers in practice understand, explain and defend what they are doing by
reference to speech acts. And this convergence between theory and practice
opens space for a conversation that both sides may ﬁnd fruitful.
To explore the convergence, I develop in this essay a case study of
the conceptions that emerged in the course of a debate among scientists
about how they should participate in policy-making. I show that the sci-
entists focused on the speech activity of advocating in order to identify the
responsibilities they undertake when giving reasons in controversy-laden sit-
uations. Speech act theories developed by argumentation scholars, and in
particular Fred Kauﬀeld, do not serve to replace these practitioners’ sense
ISBN 978–83–7431–402–2 ISSN 0860-150X 79
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/5/15 8:44 PM
Jean Goodwin
of what they are doing. Rather, academic speech act theory can help clarify
scientists’ debates over appropriate participation, and can also oﬀer them
additional practical options. In turn, theorists have much to learn from con-
ceptions of speech acts that have proved suﬃciently robust to survive the
challenges of practice.
As an investigation of practitioners’ own theories of argumentation,
this paper adds to a growing literature that attempts to bridge the “abyss”
between theorists’ and practitioners’ conceptions (Plantin, 2002) by recog-
nizing instead a theory/practice continuum (Craig, 1996). Scholars on both
sides of the Atlantic have long noted that arguers in practice deploy a so-
phisticated metadiscursive vocabulary as they try to regulate their own and
each other’s conduct (Craig, 1999; Plantin, 1996). Indeed, “argument” is it-
self a technical term that practitioners use to organize and explain what
they are doing (Craig, 2011; Craig & Tracy, 2010; Doury, 2008; Good-
win, 2007b; Plantin, 1996). Such metadiscursive commentaries on ordinary
practice may become particularly prominent when the practice is under
dispute (Philipsen, 1992). This case study of a debate about appropriate
practice establishes that speech acts provide an important interpretive re-
source for arguers. Argumentation theorists should therefore continue to
take speech act theory seriously, if they want to claim “conventional va-
lidity” (Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993), i.e. ﬁt between
their theories and the conceptions of argumentation at play in ordinary
argumentative practice.
In the following pages, I begin with a survey of approaches to speech acts
developed within the interdisciplinary argumentation theory community.
I then turn to an examination of how U.S. natural resource scientists invoke
speech acts in the course of a debate about their appropriate participation in
public life. Finally, I close by bringing theory and practice into conversation.
1. Speech acts in argumentation theory: An overview
Central to several contemporary approaches to argumentation is the
idea that an arguer’s initiating speech act creates an obligation to pro-
duce arguments with deﬁnite characteristics—e.g., arguments for a certain
proposition, of a certain amount, with certain qualities. An arguer’s initiat-
ing speech act, in other words, helps regulate the interaction between people
who disagree (an argument-2, in O’Keefe’s [1982] terms) by establishing a lo-
cal normative framework that requires the making of argument-1s that are
good in speciﬁed ways. Thus in contrast to approaches which derive norms
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of argumentation from types of interactions or dialogues (e.g., Walton, 1998)
or from a general practice (Johnson, 2000), the speech act approach posits
that it is the arguers’ own activity which provides part of the framework for
a productive exchange of arguments (Goodwin, 2007a).
This core idea has long been embedded in the theory associated with
the U.S. tradition of forensic debate. Ehninger and Brockriede’s seminal
textbook Decision by Debate (1963) uses an analogy of one person trying
to seize a piece of ground—a position—currently held by another. Phys-
ically pushing the person oﬀ the ground would both have force and run
a risk, namely a risk of reprisal. Similarly, asserting a claim to the posi-
tion “is an agitating force; it has the eﬀect of stirring up and throwing
into turmoil what had previously been a static and ordered situation.” At
the same time, “although less direct physical danger may be involved in
the verbal declaration than in the shove,” the assertor “still takes a risk
when he asserts that [the position] by rights belongs to him, for, unless his
claim is to be idle talk, he must be able to prove the necessity, expedi-
ency, or justice” of his claim, with good arguments (p. 82). An arguer who
asserts a claim thus undertakes the obligation to defend that claim with
good arguments.
In a series of essays, Peter Houtlosser works within the pragma-
dialectical framework put forward by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984),
providing a considerably more sophisticated account of the initiating speech
act as it occurs not only “in formalised, regimented” interactions such as
a forensic debate, but also “in informal, non-regimented discussions” (Hout-
losser, 1998, p. 397). In Houtlosser’s Searle-inspired analysis, the speech act
advancing a standpoint cannot be identiﬁed simply with the performance of
an assertive (Houtlosser, 2002); Houtlosser would ﬁnd the hoary maxim “he
who asserts must prove” to be fundamentally misguided. Advancing a stand-
point, ﬁrst of all, functions at a “higher textual level” (Houtlosser, 1994);
it establishes the point around which an entire interaction will revolve. The
felicity conditions require that the act be done in a speciﬁc interactional
context, namely one in which the speaker believes that the listener does
not accept the proposition being put forward (Houtlosser, 1998). And the
essential condition establishes that that advancing a standpoint “counts as
taking responsibility for a positive position in respect of [a proposition],
i.e. as assuming an obligation to defend a positive position in respect of
[that proposition] if requested to do so” (Houtlosser, 1998, p. 390). The
speech act advancing a standpoint thus initiates an argumentative interac-
tion in which the speaker ought to, intends to, and believes he can, justify
his position.
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Sally Jackson has provided additional elaborations. In work that has
also contributed to the pragma-dialectical program (Eemeren, Grooten-
dorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993), Jackson has shown how many diﬀerent
speech acts can create frameworks for argumentative interactions. Whereas
in the speech act advancing a standpoint (and in assertive speech acts gen-
erally) the focus is on the propositional content asserted, Jackson points out
that in fact, a speaker is also committed to defend the legitimacy of all the
felicity conditions of his act. As she puts it:
the single most useful contribution of speech acts theory is in explaining how
certain things come to be at issue in an argument. In the theory of speech acts,
the performance of any act is seen as committing the speaker, in principle, to
the set of beliefs and intentions embodied in the felicity conditions. Thus, the
performance of a request, promise, or other act carries with it a package of
commitments, expressible as propositions, and representing the beliefs associ-
ated with felicitous acts of that type. The speaker does not advance this series
of subordinate propositions on their own merits, but incurs responsibility for
them by virtue of performing an act for which they are rational or conven-
tional prerequisites. Conversational argument is full of bizarre little interludes
whose bearing on what might be called the issue can only be understood as
depending on the preconditions of some superordinate speech act (Jackson,
1985, pp. 128–129).
In complaining that a co-worker keeps showing up late, for example,
a speaker not only takes responsibility for the truth of his statement about
his colleague; he also takes responsibility for the bearing of the lateness
on his own concerns, for the sincerity of his distress at the conduct, and
for the legitimacy of his right to demand attention to his complaint from
his addressee. Although a speaker does not expressly advance such “virtual
standpoints,” they can potentially be called out by the addressee; together,
they constitute the “disagreement space” of propositions that (under the
right circumstances) a speaker can be obligated to defend (Jackson, 1992).
Fred Kauﬀeld provides a ﬁnal set of nuances to our understanding of
how speech acts serve to initiate and frame argumentative interactions. Like
Jackson, Kauﬀeld recognizes that many speech acts are relevant to argumen-
tation theory. But working in a Gricean tradition (Kauﬀeld, 2001, 2009),
Kauﬀeld focuses less on the diversity of the propositions to which speakers
are committed and more on the diversity of the commitments themselves.
In the basic act of saying something seriously, a speaker makes evident her
intention to induce her addressee to believe her; in doing so, she openly un-
dertakes a commitment to veracity, a commitment that in turn justiﬁes her
addressee’s trust (Moran, 2006; Stampe, 1967). To meet the pragmatic chal-
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lenges of speciﬁc situations, a speaker can expressly enhance or restrict this
basic commitment to the truth of what she is saying, and thus also enhance
or restrict her commitment to justify it with good arguments. Patterns of
such commitments that meet recurrent situational demands are given names
and recognized as distinct speech acts. For example, in proposing a speaker
wants to secure tentative consideration from an addressee who likely has bet-
ter things to do than lend her an ear. To earn her addressee’s attention, the
speaker undertakes an obligation to answer all doubts and objections to the
proposal; in other words, she undertakes a substantial burden of proof. Her
addressee can then reason that the speaker would not do this unless she was
conﬁdent that her proposal could withstand critical scrutiny, and thus fur-
ther that his attention is unlikely to be wasted (Kauﬀeld, 1998, 1999, 2002).
On the opposite extreme, in order to allow a free ﬂow of potentially im-
portant social information, in gossiping a speaker expressly waives a com-
mitment to veracity and even sincerity (Kauﬀeld & Fields, 2003); gossipers
thus undertake no obligation to make good arguments. Nor is it just the
speaker who ﬁnds herself subject to obligations to make arguments of a cer-
tain quality; in some circumstances, the speaker’s conspicuous fulﬁllment of
her argumentative obligations exercises a legitimate force on her addressee,
imposing on him in turn an obligation to respond appropriately (Kauﬀeld,
1995, 2009). Speech acts in Kauﬀeld’s view are thus sophisticated tools
through which arguers craft a local “normative terrain” (Goodwin, 2007a)
binding them both throughout their entire argumentative interaction.
Houtlosser, Jackson and Kauﬀeld each demonstrate how an initiating
speech act can provide part of the normative framework necessary to coordi-
nate a productive argumentative interaction between people who disagree,
perhaps deeply. The speech act serves to pick out the point being argued
about and to establish the nature and extent of arguers’ speciﬁc responsibil-
ities to make good arguments. Especially in the approaches of Jackson and
Kauﬀeld, many diﬀerent speech acts can be used to accomplish these tasks.
In any given case, arguers thus have a choice of the speech act to use to
initiate their interaction. I turn now to a case study of how one community
of argument practitioners is reasoning about that choice.
2. Speech acts in argumentative practice: the debate over
advocating by scientists
There is a recurring problem in civic life about how experts can produc-
tively contribute their knowledge to debates over public policy. Dealing with
83
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/5/15 8:44 PM
Jean Goodwin
this general problem has been a special concern for U.S. scientists working
in natural resource-related ﬁelds such as ecology, conservation biology, inva-
sion biology, marine biology, wildlife management and forestry. These ﬁelds
produce knowledge that is actively sought out by the resource managers
and regulators (Mills & Clark, 2001; Steel, List, Lach, & Shindler, 2004).
Their love of the natural world also propels these scientists into policy are-
nas, especially when they perceive the biodiversity and ecosystems they
cherish under imminent threat (Barry & Oelschlaeger, 1996; Myers, 1999).
So it is not surprising that scientists in these ﬁelds have long been strug-
gling with how best to participate in public life (Nelkin, 1977), and that
the issue has been subjected to repeated discussions in dedicated fora at
the ﬁelds’ conferences and in the ﬁelds’ journals (e.g., Conservation Biol-
ogy 10.3, 1996; 21.1, 2007; Human Dimensions of Wildlife 6.1, 2001; Bio-
Science 51.6, 2001).
A variety of topics have been raised in the course of this debate. There
are discussions about whether science is a value-laden or value-free ac-
tivity (Barry & Oelschlaeger, 1996; Tracy & Brussard, 1996) and about
whether participating in policy-making hinders scientists’ careers (Foote,
Krogman, & Spence, 2009; Nelson & Vucetich, 2009). Of interest for us
here is a question this community of scientists persistently asks about the
kinds of speech acts appropriate for scientists in policy controversy, and in
particular, whether scientists should advocate.
What do these scientists mean when they talk of “advocacy”? At times,
scientists use the term very broadly to refer to any sort of intervention in the
policy process (e.g., Brussard & Tull, 2007). As one scientist commented,
however, this usage is likely the result of excess wariness over possible politi-
cization of their work (Blockstein, 2002). More commonly, the focus of the
discussion of advocacy is on a particular speech activity: communication
intended to increase adherence to some speciﬁc policy proposal. Explicit
deﬁnitions of the speech activity of advocating by scientists include:
Policy advocacy: active, covert, or inadvertent support of a particular policy
or class of policies (Lackey, 2007, p. 13).
Simply deﬁned, advocacy means to write or speak in support of something
(Gill, 2001, p. 22).
Advocacy is, ﬁrst, comparing the most plausible of a collection of possible
propositions, explanations, or descriptions of an issue, and then lending one’s
active support to the ideas, policies, or proposals that are interpreted by the
researcher to oﬀer the most compelling match between the existing conditions
and policy to address or improve it (Foote et al., 2009, p. 581).
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Examples of advocacy mentioned in the debate include calling for passage of
legislation protecting endangered species (Nelson & Vucetich, 2009, p. 1091),
speaking out for action to stop climate change (Lovejoy, 1989), and inter-
vening in governmental decisions about clean water standards (Karr, 2006).
Such advocacy is not carried out exclusively by making arguments; scien-
tists understand that the term also embraces activities like “camping out in
the canopies of redwoods or lying down in front of bulldozers” (Gill, 2001,
p. 19). But as one scientist noted, “the word advocacy...has other impor-
tant connotations: of responsibility; of support; and of bearing witness to
the evidence that, as a scientist, one has gathered and weighed” (Karr, 2006,
p. 288). Throughout the debate, scientists recognize that advocates paradig-
matically proceed by making arguments. For example:
Advocacy occurs when, during the process of communicating research results,
ecologists use scientiﬁc facts to shape an argument relevant to a particular
policy goal (Morrison & Ayres, 2010, p. 50)
Advocacy involves advancing the most convincingly reasoned suggestions for
change, informed by defensible, rigorous evidence (Foote et al., 2009, p. 584)
Scientists thus perceive the speech activity advocating as providing an over-
all framework within which they oﬀer arguments in policy controversies.
Is that speech activity appropriate? I now review some of the arguments
scientists give on both sides of this question, as a way of elucidating this
community’s implicit conception of the relationship of speech acts to argu-
mentative responsibilities.
Defenders of the legitimacy of advocacy point out that scientists’ ex-
pertise positions them to be outstanding advocates. “Science is central to
the decisions” contemporary policy-makers must make, one comments,
and scientists are uniquely qualiﬁed to apply that science to the decision-
making process. Scientists do more than collect data. Their training, and the
day to-day practice of their profession, centers on gathering evidence for and
against hypotheses, weighing that evidence, and drawing conclusions based
on the evidence. Their analytical expertise, coupled with detailed knowledge
in particular ﬁelds of study, equips them to understand and explain scien-
tiﬁc conclusions and describe how that information is relevant to a speciﬁc
policy context or situation.... The training that scientists receive—to ques-
tion the assumptions and conventions of science—also equips them to chal-
lenge the assumptions of public policy, the law, and implementation of the law
(Karr, 2006, p. 287).
In many cases, scientists are thus both “the best arbiters of whether
a premise is objective and true,” and also, “given their high level of skill and
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training in rational thought,... better prepared than many citizens to con-
struct and assess arguments representing policy” (Nelson & Vucetich, 2009,
p. 1085). For some, scientists’ expertise not only equips them to be bet-
ter at making arguments, it actually obligates them to do so. “Indeed it
is our responsibility,” one scientist insists, “as those who understand best
what is happening and what alternatives exist, to sound the tocsin about
environmental deterioration and conservation problems in all their variety”
(Lovejoy, 1989, p. 330). Scientists share the general obligation of all citizens
to advocate for what they believe within the deliberative process, and even
more, since “scientists are distinctive among citizens because they possess
a distinctively valuable understanding of objective analysis and descriptive
facts about the world” they have “a strong obligation” to do so (Nelson
& Vucetich, 2009, p. 1099). And if they don’t live up to this obligation, others
with less knowledge and understanding—special-interest groups, lawyers, re-
ligious leaders, legislators, and judges” (Foote et al., 2009, p. 582)—will step
in to ﬁll the gap, to the detriment of the policy process. As an article by
a particularly trenchant pair of scientists concluded,
ultimately it is a perversion of democracy to muﬄe the voice of the most
knowledgeable among us, and consequently amplify the voice of those with the
greatest ignorance. Silencing scientists who wish to be just and transparent
advocates promotes mob rule or despotic rule by special interests (Nelson
& Vucetich, 2009, p. 1099).
On the other side, opponents argue that advocacy by scientists will un-
dermine the special respect that the public grants them. Some point out
that advocacy will have an unfortunate impact on scientists’ objectivity,
with conﬁrmation bias distorting scientists’ judgment of what to study, how
to study it, and how to interpret the results (Nielsen, 2001; Wiens, 1997).
Others point out that even if the scientist remains psychologically objec-
tive, he will not appear objective to public audiences because the norms
that structure the activity of advocacy and the practice of science are in-
compatible. As one scientist explains, science and advocacy are orthogonal
“dimensions” which lead in diﬀerent directions:
Many conservationists are proudly zealous about being environmental advo-
cates, and they see science as an excuse by some to be apathetic. Actually,
science requires an open-minded approach that can accept new models of what
is known, supported by new data and analyses. Thus, it is diﬃcult for a scien-
tist zealously to advocate singular solutions to environmental problems except
under the simplest of circumstances. It also follows that it would be diﬃcult
unswervingly to advocate a particular solution to a complex environmental
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problem without depending upon a certain amount of dogma as a source of
knowledge. Thus, in the extreme, the knowledge and advocacy dimensions in-
teract such that objective scientists cannot ordinarily be zealous activists, and
zealous activists cannot be constrained by objective science as a sole source of
knowledge (Tracy & Brussard, 1996, p. 918)
Another scientist makes a similar point, diﬀerentiating between the com-
mitments undertaken by advocates and scientists:
[Advocates] have made a commitment to a particular idea, philosophy, per-
spective, value, person, place, and so forth. Having made such a commitment,
they work to convince others to accept their viewpoint and make the same
commitment. Scientists and professionals, in contrast, write or speak in sup-
port of nothing. The only commitment scientists and professionals have made
is to their current understanding of the truth (Nielsen, 2001, pp. 40–41).
Scientist-advocates will thus likely display the same passion, selective use of
evidence, and character attacks that political advocates ordinarily do (Aron,
Burke, & Freeman, 2002). But as they do so, they will be conspicuously
abandoning the normative standards that gave them authority in the ﬁrst
place. Thus the “environmental advocate loses power to persuade because
the advocate is seen as not being open-minded and objective about solutions
to environmental problems” (Tracy & Brussard, 1996, p. 918). One scientist
termed this a “paradox,” explaining that
when professionals decide to use the power of their expert knowledge to control
policy outcomes, the public image of professionalism subtly metamorphoses. It
transforms the professional’s role from reliable expert into competing interest,
and credibility erodes. The erosion of credibility reduces political power and
a paradoxical futile cycle ensues. The paradox lies in the fact that the political
power of professionals can be retained only if it is not exercised (Gill, 2001,
pp. 22–23).
In this view, scientists can advocate; but if they do so, they will stop being
perceived as scientists.
The concern that advocacy by scientists erodes scientiﬁc credibility is
a signiﬁcant one, mentioned by practically every scientist who contributed
to the debate. Scientist-advocates appear to face what climate scientist
Stephen Schneider famously termed the “double ethical bind” (Schnei-
der, 1988) that plagues science communication generally. Advocacy and the
practice of science are both normatively structured. But the norms of the
two activities conﬂict. What it takes to be good at one of the activities
is incompatible with what it takes to be good at the other, so scientists
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are constantly confronting choices like whether to be up front about un-
certainties (good science, poor, overly-complex public communication) or
to simplify uncertainties (good public communication, poor science). This
dilemma, like perhaps all the dilemmas that underpin communication prac-
tices, cannot be resolved; but it can be managed (Craig & Tracy, 1995).
The central issue in the debate thus becomes not whether scientists should
advocate in either the general or speciﬁc sense, but how they should do so:
How should we as citizen-scientists participate in the arena of public policy, as
individuals and as a professional scientiﬁc society? How do we best meet the
simultaneous demands of science and citizenship? How can scientists promote
the timely and responsible use of scientiﬁc information and concepts in the
policy-making process (Meine & Meﬀe, 1996, p. 916)?
Two main strategies for managing this dilemma are evident within the de-
bate. Proponents of advocacy aim to integrate the two sets of norms into
a new approach to communication; opponents of advocacy aim to identify
other speech acts whose norms are less in tension with the norms of science.
Consider the ﬁrst strategy: the proposal that advocacy and science
should be integrated. In this approach, the central question that needs
to be addressed is “what general qualities should characterize [scientists’]
advocacy?” (Nelson & Vucetich, 2009, p. 1091). Proponents argue that
scientist-advocates should take on additional responsibilities in order to
preserve their authority while also defending their position. They variously
call such advocacy-plus “responsible advocacy” (Foote et al., 2009), “hon-
est advocacy” (Noss, 2007), or “justiﬁed, transparent advocacy” (Nelson
& Vucetich, 2009); its special obligations are said to include:
1. Scientist-advocates should change their public positions when the evi-
dence demands it (Meyer, Frumhoﬀ, Hamburg, & de la Rosa, 2010; Nelson
& Vucetich, 2009; Noss, 2007).
2. Scientist-advocates should not (like “sophists”—Nelson & Vucetich, 2009)
use the most eﬀective arguments for their policy positions; they should
use only the best available, peer-reviewed, data-supported science to make
their cases (Blockstein, 2002; Foote et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2010; Nelson
& Vucetich, 2009).
3. Scientist-advocates should be fully open about uncertainties, margins of
error, caveats and limitations (Blockstein, 2002; Meyer et al., 2010).
4. Scientist-advocates should bring forward counter-considerations that weigh
against the policies for which they advocate (Foote et al., 2009; Lach, List,
Steel, & Shindler, 2003; Nielsen, 2001)
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These and other supererogatory commitments bring the normative structure
of advocacy closer to that of science, reducing or eliminating the conﬂict that
threatened to undermine the credibility of the scientist-advocate.
By contrast, critics of advocacy by scientists frame the central question
of how scientists should participate in policy controversies as one of choice
between multiple options:
There are many ways to express and act upon values, and the most eﬀective are
not necessarily the most visible or audible. Values express themselves diﬀer-
ently among diﬀerent people, and our chosen modes of expression necessarily
change from time to time and according to circumstances. ...Where one can
best devote one’s energies, what points one choses to advocate, and when one
should shift strategies are matters of personal conscience, insight, and choice
(Meine & Meﬀe, 1996, p. 917).
In this approach, scientiﬁc credibility can be reconciled with full participa-
tion in the policy process by directing attention to the many ways scientists
can contribute, over and above advocacy. In a recent editorial, two leading
scientists urge going beyond the oversimpliﬁed debate about advocacy:
We suggest it is time to shift the question from whether conservation profes-
sionals should be advocates to how the expertise of scientists and professional
societies can be given greater weight in ongoing discussions regarding policies
and management actions that aﬀect biological diversity.... The notion that
a scientist is either an advocate or does nothing at all to shape policy is a false
dichotomy that has muddied the debate about science and advocacy. We agree
that doing nothing to help shape environmental policy is irresponsible. We do
not believe, however, that our choices are either advocate or do nothing (Scott
& Rachlow, 2011, pp. 2–3)
One of the earliest lists of options included the speech activity of advocating
along with four alternative acts/activities:
– reporting scientiﬁc results that others use in making decisions on natural
resource management issues,
– reporting and then interpreting scientiﬁc results for others who are in-
volved in natural resource management decisions,
– working closely with managers and others in integrating scientiﬁc results
into management decisions
– actively advocating for speciﬁc and preferred natural resource manage-
ment decisions, and
– making decisions about natural resource management and policy (Lach
et al., 2003, p. 174).
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Related lists of potential speech acts by scientists include “Data, Interpre-
tation, Advice, Counsel, Advocacy” (Blockstein, 2002, p. 92); reporting, an-
swering questions, evaluating options, advocating (Scott, Rachlow, & Lackey,
2008p. 867, borrowing from Pielke, 2007); and educating, promoting, and ad-
vocating (Minnis & Stout McPeake, 2001).
Although the debate among scientists over how to contribute to policy-
making continues, my survey of it cannot. I have discussed the way that
scientists frame the debate as one over the appropriateness of a particu-
lar speech activity—advocating. Proponents of advocacy by scientists argue
that advocacy is permissible—even obligatory—and that in a modiﬁed form,
is compatible with the norms of good science. Opponents of advocacy by
scientists argue that the norms of advocacy and science are incompatible,
and that it is best to seek alternative speech acts for public participation. It
is now time to step back and bring theorists and practitioners into conver-
sation, asking how the conceptions of speech acts articulated by scientists
in the debate, and by argumentation scholars in their theories, align.
3. Aligning conceptions of speech acts in theory and practice
Many issues turned up in scientists’ debate over appropriate means of
public participation: the nature of scientiﬁc practice (e.g., objective v. sub-
jective), the cognitive functions relevant to public policy (e.g., analyzing, in-
tegrating), and possible institutional arrangements (e.g., scientist/manager
collaborations, advisory committees). Nevertheless, it should be seen as re-
markable that a major focus throughout the debate has been a speech activ-
ity, advocating. In close alignment with the argumentation theory reviewed
in the ﬁrst section of the paper, scientists take this speech act as providing
an overarching framework for the complex, ongoing interactions they seek to
have with members of the public and policy-makers. Furthermore, scientists
like theorists recognize that the speech act has an intimate connection with
argumentation; one of the key tasks of the scientist-advocate is precisely to
make good arguments. Based on the evidence of this case, we can therefore
conclude that speech act approaches have a strong “conventional validity”
as a theory of argumentation.
Among the three speciﬁc approaches discussed in the ﬁrst section of
this paper, it is that of Fred Kauﬀeld which seems to resonate best with
scientists’ own way of conceptualizing advocating. In their discussions of the
speech act, scientists do not focus on what the advocate is advocating—
on the speciﬁc propositions that the advocate is committed to defend, as
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would be predicted by both Houtlosser and Jackson. Instead, scientists are
attending closely to the extent of the advocate’s commitment, and in par-
ticular whether as scientists they have enhanced commitments, over and
above those of ordinary advocates. As we saw, in the debate scientists are
concerned with questions like: Ought the scientist-advocate report uncer-
tainties, caveats, limitations? Ought she reveal strong arguments against
her view? Ought she select arguments on the basis of their scientiﬁc strength,
or on the basis of their persuasiveness with the given audience? And ought
she give up her position when the science tends against her? In debating
these points, scientists, like Kauﬀeld, take the speech activity of advocating
to be a particular package of commitments, and in particular commitments
to make arguments of a certain quality.
Scientists’ understanding of the speciﬁc obligations undertaken by the
advocate also aligns well with recent work that follows Kauﬀeld. In a pa-
per reviewing the codes of conduct developed by professional advocates in
law and public relations (Goodwin, 2013), I have advanced a preliminary
account of the obligations that constitute advocating. In agreement with sci-
entists’ basic deﬁnitions of the speech activity, I argued that an advocate’s
primary commitment is to the zealous support of a particular proposition,
person, or cause. At the same time, advocates also undertake an obligation
to maintain the integrity of the communication system within which they
communicate. For example, advocates must avoid known falsehoods and be
able to defend what they do put forward with at least minimally plausible
arguments; otherwise their statements would be completely untrustworthy.
Although scientists do not discuss the obligations of advocating in this level
of detail, their understanding of the conﬂicts between advocating and the
practice of science reveal just these areas of concern. Whereas the practice of
science requires telling “the whole truth” about uncertainties and counter-
considerations, scientists rightly recognize that advocates do not have this
obligation, and indeed will work hard to suppress such information if it hurts
their overall cases.
The account of advocating that I have proposed also tends to reinforce
the legitimacy of scientists’ concerns about the impact of advocacy on sci-
entiﬁc credibility. On the one hand, an advocate is obligated to show zeal
for his cause, investing much more eﬀort and passion than speakers are or-
dinarily obliged to use in defending their statements. From this perspective,
advocacy for wilderness preservation or biodiversity can be seen as noble
and inspiring. But it is also the case that an advocate owes a much weaker
obligation to his audience than is ordinarily the case. So from the perspec-
tive of the audience, advocates are viewed with legitimate suspicion, and
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their statements subjected to careful scrutiny—if they are listened to at
all. Scientists are thus rightly cautious about joining the ranks of lawyers,
publicity agents, lobbyists and other advocacy professionals.
Is it possible to integrate the advocate’s zealous defense of a cause with
the scientist’s heightened commitments to truth? Can there be an advocacy–
plus—a responsible advocacy, as some scientists argued? Within a Gricean
approach to speech acts, there is in principle no problem with combining
various commitments. A speech act is in part a bundle of commitments;
there are many more ways of going about acting with language than are
picked out and given names, and language users are constantly creating
new options. So there is no reason that (for example) one could not under-
take both to advocate and to do so using only sentences found in the ﬁrst
edition of The Sorrows of Young Werther. The question is not whether such
a novel bundling of commitments is possible, but rather whether it is prag-
matically plausible: whether this bundle would give the addressee of the act
a reason to respond as expected. Unfortunately, scientists proposing to un-
dertake the extra obligations of a responsible advocate will likely encounter
a routine pragmatic diﬃculty. As above, addressees rightfully are suspicious
of what an advocate says, since the advocate owes them little more than
the avoidance of outright lying. This attitude of distrust will extend to any
metadiscursive comments that the advocate tries to provide. This means
that although a scientist-advocate may be sincerely committed to telling
the “whole truth,” he will likely ﬁnd it hard to persuade his addressees that
this is the case. Absent special reasons for trust, they will dismiss his state-
ments about his extra commitments as just more advocacy—rather like they
would dismiss a used car salesman’s promise of a special deal, just for them.
From the point of view of speech act theory, a more pragmatically plau-
sible way out of the science/advocacy normative dilemma can be found by
taking the other route suggested in the scientists’ debate: by looking for
other ways for scientists to participate in policy controversies. There are
many speech acts and activities through which scientiﬁc knowledge might
be communicated, and many of them involve commitments that are more
compatible with the norms of science. Scientists in the debate occasionally
mention educating, for example; a cluster of speech acts pragmatically de-
signed to convey knowledge. Reporting is another commonly used option; in
Kauﬀeld’s recent account, reports are “designed to facilitate their critical
appropriation by self-reliant lay [i.e., non-expert] addressees” (2012, p. 238).
Perhaps most promising of the alternatives is the speech act advising.
In fact, the term is often used in the debate interchangeably with “ad-
vocacy” (e.g., Meyer et al., 2010). Advice is generally given where there is
92
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/5/15 8:44 PM
Conceptions of Speech Acts in the Theory and Practice of Argumentation...
an asymmetry of knowledge—where one person is trying to make a decision,
while another knows more about case. The expert would like to help, but is
correctly afraid that her intervention might appear to be presumptuous med-
dling with her addressee’s concerns. The commitments undertaken in the
act of advising are expressly intended to manage this pragmatic diﬃculty.
Turning to Kauﬀeld again: “where a speaker gives advice, (i) she tells the
advisee something which she at least purports to believe he needs to know,
and (ii) she openly takes responsibility for trying assist him in determining
what to do about his concerns” (Kauﬀeld, 1999). In advising, in other words,
the speaker openly undertakes to promote her addressee’s interests, not her
own policy decision. Since both the scientist and her addressee presumably
share an interest in the best scientiﬁc knowledge available, it should be less
normatively stressful to be a scientist-advisor than a scientist-advocate.
Thus far, I have noted convergences between scientists’ and argumen-
tation theorists’ conceptions of speech acts, and also several ways in which
the theorists might contribute to clarifying the debate. Let me close by ac-
knowledging one area in which theorists might learn from practitioners. As
the overview of the debate in Section 2 of this paper showed, some propo-
nents of advocacy by scientists argue strongly that such advocacy is in fact
normatively required. All citizens have the duty to advocate for what they
believe; scientists, being uniquely positioned both with respect to knowledge
and reasoning abilities, have a higher responsibility to do so. Although ar-
gumentation theorists have devoted signiﬁcant attention to the obligations
that are undertaken in speech acts, they have given less thought to possible
obligations to commit a given speech at all. Houtlosser, Jackson and Kauf-
feld all take the speech acts which initiate argumentative interactions as in
some basic way conditional on other interests or activities: if you want to
enter into a critical discussion, if you want to keep the conversation going,
if you want to address one of a number of recurrent interpersonal diﬃcul-
ties, then you use the appropriate speech act, which obligates you to be
ready with arguments. But why should you do so? Fabio Paglieri (Paglieri
& Castelfranchi, 2010) is perhaps the only argumentation theorist who has
addressed this problem, but even he examines only the costs and beneﬁts of
initiating an argumentative interaction, not the possible obligation to do so.
Argumentation theorists interested in developing any of the speech act ap-
proaches further may want to add to their research agendas the question of
why the initiating speech acts ought to get made.
This essay has attempted to advance our understanding of the speech
activity of advocating and its usefulness in communicating science in contro-
versial policy contexts. Independent of this particular aim, however, I hope
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it has also served as a demonstration of the usefulness of working along
a theory-practice continuum. Theorists can help practitioners better artic-
ulate, organize, ground and critique the conceptions of speech acts that are
already partially articulate in their practice. Practitioners, in turn, can of-
fer theorists a chance to see how (or whether) their abstract conceptions
of speech acts play out when confronted with the pragmatic challenges of
maintaining good argumentative interactions among people who disagree.
Since there are many speech acts of interest to argumentation theorists,
and many communities of arguers facing pragmatic challenges, we can look
forward to many future conversations between theorists and practitioners
of argumentation.
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